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YOU SAY TAKINGS, AND I SAY TAKINGS: THE
HISTORY AND POTENTIAL OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
DARREN BOTELLO-SAMSON†
I. INTRODUCTION
Few federal statutes inspire as much public reaction, both
negative and positive, as the Endangered Species Act (“ESA” or “the
Act”).1 Much of this attention has manifested itself in federal
courtrooms, where litigants have tried to either expand or contract
the scope of federal powers under the Act. Significant attention has
been paid to the legal arguments made by those bringing litigation,
especially those arguments that focus on the Commerce Clause.2
While such attention is clearly merited and Commerce Clause
challenges to ESA are far from being things of the past, such
challenges have generally proved to be unsuccessful in federal courts.
Those challenging the implementation of ESA occasionally turn
toward regulatory takings challenges to combat what they see as an
unfair imposition of a public demand on the property rights of a
single individual.
The concept of regulatory takings is based on the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Whenever the government takes an
individual’s property, it must do so under three constitutionally
mandated guidelines: (1) the property must be put to public use, (2)
the taking of the property must be through due process, and (3) just

† Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University-New
Brunswick.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Sara D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the
Endangered Species Act, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459 (2004); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate
Threatened Species, 36 GA. L. REV. 723 (2002); Maya R. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County, 7 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 191 (2001); Omar N. White,
The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000); J. Blanding
Holman VI, After United States v. Lopez, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139 (1995).
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compensation must be paid to the original owner.3 When a property
owner claims that a regulation, while leaving the property in his or
her possession, effectively diminishes the property’s value or limits a
particular right in that property, that owner is claiming a regulatory
taking that demands compensation.
While it is generally recognized on all sides of the debate that
property rights “are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power”4 in light of certain “background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed upon land
ownership,”5 the exact placement of the boundary line between
property rights and legitimate governmental powers is hotly
contested. At stake is the effectiveness of regulatory regimes that
often collide with private property rights and interests: “Often the
mere threat of a lawsuit raising a takings challenge is enough to
dissuade legislators and city councils from passing environmental
measures, even where the proposed regulation clearly would comply
with judicial takings tests.”6
This article begins by examining the statutory framework of
ESA, which was enacted in 1973 and gave certain regulatory powers
to federal agencies. Specifically, it provided that the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) would regulate individual,
commercial, and governmental activities to protect endangered
species. Central to this statute is the prohibition of a “take,” which
7
means to kill, harm, harass, capture, etc. an endangered species. The
next section examines the judicial history of ESA, addressing the
legal context in which regulatory takings challenges are currently
fought. This article then discusses the history of regulatory takings
8
jurisprudence. Finally, the last two sections cover the history of
regulatory takings challenges to ESA, as well as the potential for such
challenges in the near future.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
5. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
6. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 1051 (2d ed. 1998).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
8. At this point, it is important to remind the reader not to confuse the context of the term
“take,” in the above discussed context of ESA, with the other type of “take,” which refers to the
taking of property for which compensation is required.
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II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Congress enacted ESA in 1973 for the stated purpose of
“provid[ing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved.”9 Through the enactment of the Act, Congress recognized
that a diversity of “species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic,
10
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value,”
and declared that such threats to biodiversity are “a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation.”11 ESA casts a wide net to promote conservation,
focusing on everything from individual species to habitats, and from
private citizens to the government itself.
In Section 4, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
exercise powers aimed at determining the species and habitats that
need government protection. In addition to the power to declare
whether a particular species is endangered or threatened,12 the
Secretary is also authorized to declare “critical habitat”13 and
promulgate regulations necessary for the survival of the species.
While the Act certainly grants the Secretary significant power in the
listing of endangered and threatened species, the Act also places
upon the Secretary guidelines and restrictions in the use of this
power. For instance, the Act establishes a timetable for the
declaration of petitioned species and the review of such declarations,
making negative declarations open to judicial review.14 More
significantly, while the Act allows the Secretary to take “into
consideration the economic impact”15 of a critical habitat designation,
determinations of species listings are to be made “solely on the basis
16
of the best scientific and commercial data available.” In addition to
these listing powers, Section 5 of the Act authorizes the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior “to acquire by purchase, donation, or
otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein”17 as a way to set aside
critical habitat.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
Id. § 1531(a)(3).
Id. § 1531(a)(1).
Id. § 1533(a)(1).
Id. § 1533(a)(3).
Id. § 1533(b)(3).
Id. § 1533(b)(2).
Id. § 1533(b)(1).
Id. § 1534(a)(2).
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The acquisition of habitat lands, while deemed by Congress as an
important part of a larger policy of protecting endangered species,
would be cost prohibitive if implemented as the sole means of
achieving the goals of ESA. The Act, therefore, also restricts
behaviors that further threaten endangered species. The Section 7
provisions of ESA require that all federal agencies “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . [does
not] jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species.”18
In addition to the Section 7 provisions regarding federal agency
actions, Section 9 of ESA governs the actions of private individuals.
Along with prohibiting the importation, exportation, and interstate
19
sale of endangered species, the Act also prohibits the “taking” of
any endangered species within the United States or upon the high
seas by anyone under United States jurisdiction.20 While the Section 9
prohibitions against takings can be interpreted as both broad and
draconian, Section 10 allows for so-called “incidental takings.” In this
section of ESA, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
establish Habitat Conservation Plans (“HCP”), which allow for
limited takings of endangered or threatened species provided that the
“taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.”21 To acquire a permit for such takings, the
applicant must demonstrate the incidental nature of the taking, that
procedures will be in place to minimize the taking, and that
alternatives have been considered but are demonstrably less
favorable.22 These various provisions and components of ESA have
been thoroughly examined and interpreted by the courts, thereby
heavily embedding ESA’s statutory history within the U.S. judiciary.
III. ESA IN THE COURTS
While regulatory takings challenges to ESA are a fairly recent
phenomenon, they have not developed, nor do they take place within,
a legal and political environment absent a contextual history. A long
observed characteristic of the American judiciary is “that it can only

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 1536(a)(2).
Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A, E-F).
Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B-C).
Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A-B).
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act when it is called upon, . . . it does not pursue criminals, hunt out
wrongs, or examine evidence of its own accord.”23 This means that the
very evolving political forces in which ESA was created was also the
context in which its challenges occurred. Therefore, regulatory
takings challenges arise in a context dependent upon the successes
and failures of other challenges pursued for reasons ranging from
changes in political climate to changes in the law itself. Whereas a
regulatory takings challenge focuses, by legal necessity, upon a
“concrete controversy,”24 other legal challenges may be made more
efficacious with the addition of broader goals. For example, legal
challenges to ESA apart from regulatory takings challenges have
included cases involving statutory interpretation and interstate
commerce.
A. Statutory Interpretation
While Congress was clear in its reasons for passing ESA,25 the
guidelines for implementation of the Act are considerably less
specific. Ambiguous terms leave the Secretary of the Interior with
considerable leeway when following these congressional directives.
The extent of this discretion, and the decisions made with it, rapidly
brought ESA before the courts for judicial interpretation of the Act.
Two cases stand out as foundational in shaping the way courts would
interpret the meaning and requirements of ESA, and together they
form “the bedrock upon which most subsequent U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service implementation actions have been based.”26
The first of these cases involves the well known halting of
construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River, an
area that had been declared critical habitat for a small fish called the
27
snail darter. In TVA v. Hill, construction on the nearly completed
dam was halted by the Supreme Court despite the large amount of
federal dollars already spent on the program and the continued
issuance of funds by Congress, which had been made aware of the
presence of the snail darter in committee meetings.28 Even with such

23. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73 (Richard D. Heffner, ed.
Penguin Books 1956) (1835).
24. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a-c).
26. Lynn Dwyer et al., Property Rights Case Law and the Challenge to the Endangered
Species Act, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 725, 728 (1995).
27. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
28. Id. at 163-67.
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economic impacts, the Court argued that an “examination of the
language, history, and structure of the legislation under review here
indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to
be afforded the highest of priorities.”29 The presumption had been
made by all involved in the case that “operation of the Tellico Dam
will either eradicate the known population of snail darters or destroy
their critical habitat.”30 Since the TVA operated as a recipient of
federal funds, judicial recourse to balancing the economic interests of
the TVA and taxpayers to the value of an endangered species
calculated by Congress as “incalculable” would be impossible.31 As far
as Section 7 provisions on agency actions are concerned, TVA
established a judicial view of ESA as a “mandate to protect species
notwithstanding economic effects.”32
Whereas TVA interpreted ESA as strongly enforceable against
the actions of the federal government, a district court decision one
year later “formally expanded the scope of the Act to nonfederal
33
actions on private lands.” In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land
and Natural Resources,34 several nongovernmental organizations
brought suit on behalf of, and in the name of, the endangered palila
(Psittirostra bailleui), a six-inch long bird named by the FWS as a
“high priority species.”35 The critical habitat of the palila was
threatened by a state program that maintained feral sheep and goats
for game-hunting purposes on the land, thereby causing overconsumption of the plants on which the palila depends.36
In ruling that the state program violated ESA, and that the Act
extends federal power over the states, the District Court for the
District of Hawaii, after considering the economic feasibility of
37
removing the feral animals from the critical habitat, based its
decision on two legal considerations. First, the District Court argued
that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to establish a
law regulating state actions regarding endangered species. Even
though the Hawaii state program used no federal funds, and did not

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 187.
Dwyer, supra note 26, at 728.
Id.
471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979).
Id. at 987-88.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 990-91.
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involve any species directly in interstate commerce, the Supreme
Court had long established that intrastate actions that affect interstate
38
commerce are also under federal authority. Although the regulation
of wildlife has historically been regarded as falling under state
sovereignty, the District Court found substantial precedence stating
that when a conflict between federal and state law is present, “a
state’s control over wildlife within its borders must yield to the
federal commerce power.”39 Therefore, the enforceability of ESA
extends into state jurisdiction, since the Act “preserves the
possibilities of interstate commerce in . . . species and of interstate
movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or
professional scientists who come to a state to observe and study these
species, that would otherwise be lost by state inaction.”40 Second, the
District Court also relied upon the Act’s citizen suit provisions, which
give private citizens the right to sue “any . . . governmental
instrumentality or agency.”41 By participating in federally legislated
activities, the State of Hawaii implicitly consented to Congress’
42
abrogation of the state’s sovereign immunity.
These two cases together establish a judicial interpretation of
ESA as a strongly enforceable manifestation of congressional will to
protect endangered and threatened species, regardless of economic
impact. Such an interpretation of ESA would not be long lived,
however, as the interpretation of the Act underwent changes not
from the judiciary, but from Congress itself. Public reaction to these
two cases, in particular the well-publicized TVA decision, prompted
Congress to review the Acts provisions on agency actions in 1978.
Eventually Congress allowed agencies to consider economic factors,
and in 1982, Congress established the HCP components of Section 10,
43
allowing for incidental takes. Despite this congressional clarification,
the courts continue to be called upon to engage in statutory
interpretation of ESA.
One specific area of ESA which was subjected to the statutory
interpretation of the District Court in Palila was the Section 9

38. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
39. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 992. See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Douglas v.
Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
40. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(A) (2000).
42. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 987.
43. Dwyer, supra note 26, at 729.
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prohibitions on the taking of endangered species.44 The Act defines
“take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
45
capture, or collect.” While this definition is expansive, it is not clear
that the modification of critical habitat, especially in a manner as
indirect as not removing feral species, fits within the statutory
definition. In Palila, the District Court relied upon federal regulations
that expanded the definition to include “significant environmental
modification or degradation.”46 This definition, however, comes from
the Secretary of the Interior, not Congress. Furthermore, this
47
definition was used prior to 1982, when Congress added incidental
take provisions to ESA, thus allowing for a degree of habitat
modification under the guidance of an HCP. All of this left the
interpretation of a fundamental term of ESA up in the air.
In 1995, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the authority of
the Secretary of the Interior to apply the terms “take” and “harm” to
habitat, and not just direct actions against species themselves. The
Court’s decision in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Community for a
48
Great Oregon dealt with a facial challenge to the regulatory
definition of “harm,” which includes significant habitat modification
and degradation. Respondents in the case, an interest group
representing logging companies and the communities and families
that depend on the jobs they provide, “alleged that application of the
‘harm’ regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered
species, and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species, had
injured them economically.”49
Although the Court acknowledged that the Act’s legislative
history demonstrates a congressional consideration and removal of
habitat modification language from a definition of harm,50 the Court
argued that the actual text of ESA supports the Secretary’s definition.
The Court stated that “an ordinary understanding”51 of the word and
52
the Act’s stated broad purpose both require an interpretation of
harm to include habitat modification “to provide a means whereby

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1532(19).
Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2005)).
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 698.
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the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved.”53 Furthermore, the 1982 addition
of the incidental taking provisions led the Court to argue that
Congress must have interpreted ESA to cover indirect, as well as
direct, takings because an incidental direct taking would not make
54
sense.
B. Commerce Clause Challenges
The District Court in Palila recognized that Congress’ authority
over the legislation of endangered species rests in its commerce
55
power, or its constitutional authority to “regulate commerce with
56
foreign nations, among the several States, and with Indian tribes.”
While basing the protection of endangered species, which both the
Supreme Court and Congress have described as “incalculable,”57 on
something as economically specific as commerce may seem tenuous,
the Court has interpreted Congress’ Commerce Clause powers to
extend beyond the tradable and sellable things in themselves and to
the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, and
activities that substantially affect commerce.58
Under this Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
exercised strong judicial restraint and a low level of scrutiny when
asked to evaluate congressional authority within federal statutes
59
based upon Congress’ commerce power. This position is favorable to
advocates of ESA, as the low population numbers of endangered
species, by definition, make them more susceptible to being located
entirely within one state, thus giving rise to challenges arguing that
the regulation of some endangered species lies outside of Congress’
authority. Although the Supreme Court itself has not directly
evaluated ESA’s relation with interstate commerce, three cases

53. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
54. Babbit, 515 U.S. at 698-99.
55. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 999 (D. Haw. 1979).
56. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
57. Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978).
58. Perez v. United States, 402 US 146, 150 (1971).
59. See Hodel v. Va. Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (expressing concern over the Court’s omission of “substantial” from the
“substantially affects” test); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226 (1983); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555 (1985) (“[T]he
national political process systematically protects states from the risk of having their functions . . .
handicapped by Commerce Clause regulations.”); Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (“[W]e
must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce.”).
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demonstrate a potential shift in the highest court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which may weaken ESA’s defense against Commerce
Clause scrutiny.
60
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Lopez,
61
with United States v. Morrison following five years later. Together,
these two cases mark a departure from the Court’s deference to
Congress in its interpretation of the extent of its Commerce Clause
powers. Both cases dealt with acts passed by Congress that,
respectively, federally criminalized the possession of a firearm within
a school zone62 and provided a federal civil remedy for victims of
63
gender based violence. These decisions, both of which were
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, determined that Congress had
exceeded its constitutional reach under the Commerce Clause in
enacting the legislation.64 Furthermore, in both cases the Court
concluded that the questioned legislation failed to meet the Court’s
test of substantially affecting commerce65 primarily because the
66
legislation did not deal with an economic activity, a point
reemphasized in the Morrison decision.67 In both opinions, Chief
Justice Rehnquist characterized the statutes as products of a Congress
in the historical moment of exercising “considerably greater latitude
in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce Clause
than . . . previous case law permitted.”68
In determining that the activity in question in Lopez did not
substantially affect interstate commerce, the Court established a set
of factors to more fully articulate the substantial effects test. The
Lopez substantial effects test involves determining whether the
questioned activity is economic in nature,69 whether it contains an
“express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to . . . an
70
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce,” and

60. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
61. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
63. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02.
64. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
65. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
66. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
67. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; see also Jacalyn R. Fleming, Comment, The Scope of Federal
Authority Under the Endangered Species Act: Implications for Local Land Use Planning, 65
ALB. L. REV. 497, 506 (2001).
68. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
69. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
70. Id. at 562.
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whether the legislative history demonstrates that Congress discovered
a connection to interstate commerce.71 Finally, the Court also
recognized that the complexity of society connects every activity, in
some way, to interstate activity. Therefore, the question becomes not
whether there is a connection to interstate commerce, but to what
72
degree. These factors are now examined in each and every judicial
determination of the constitutionality of congressional action based
on Commerce Clause authority.73
The third case that may weaken ESA against Commerce Clause
challenges is actually neither an ESA case nor a Commerce Clause
case. In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Solid Waste
Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”),74 a case that
challenged the Army Corps of Engineers as having overstepped the
bounds established by Congress in the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). In
this case, petitioners argued that the Army Corps’ CWA jurisdiction,
which enables the Corps to require and issue permits for the dumping
of dredge and fill materials into “navigable waters,”75 did not extend
to “an abandoned sand and gravel pit,”76 which had subsequently
filled with water and which petitioners had purchased for the
dumping of solid waste. The Corps argued that they did have CWA
jurisdiction because of the Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule,” a
promulgated regulation interpreting the CWA as extending to cover
intrastate waters used by migratory birds.77
The case hinged upon the interpretation of “navigable waters,”
the term used in the Clean Water Act to define jurisdiction. In the
majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
acknowledged that the term “navigable” need not be strictly
interpreted, and it was Congress’ intention that CWA should apply to
some waters that may not be technically navigable, such as non78
navigable tributaries to navigable waters. Although the Court
argued that the Corps was not limited to a strict definition of the

71. Id.
72. Id. at 566-67.
73. Sara D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the
Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 464-65 (2004).
74. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
76. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162.
77. Id. at 164.
78. Id. at 172; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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word, the Court also pointed out that “it is one thing to give a word
limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.”79
To determine the accuracy of the Corps’ statutory interpretation,
the Court turned to its own Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
declaring that when “an administrative interpretation of a statute
invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear
indication that Congress intended that result.”80 Citing its own recent
Lopez and Morrison decisions, the Court evaluated the Corps’ claim
that “the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ falls within Congress’ power to
regulate intrastate activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate
81
commerce.” While not answering definitively whether migratory
birds have a substantial nexus with interstate commerce, the Court
stated that the “arguments raise significant constitutional questions.”82
Therefore, while the Court did not answer whether the protection of
various types of species would pass Commerce Clause muster, it may
have tipped its hand by declaring such issues to be, at least, at the
83
“outer limits of Congress’ power.”
Despite the evolution of Supreme Court Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to a state of increased scrutiny of Congress’ commerce
power, ESA has not been weakened in the courts by Commerce
Clause challenges. The primary reason is that the Supreme Court has
not heard any Commerce Clause challenges to ESA. Lower federal
courts have, however, heard such challenges, and have ruled that
various applications of ESA are not only within Congress’ Commerce
Clause power, but are also consistent with the Lopez and Morrison
decisions.
Shortly after Lopez, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
84
heard National Ass’n of Home Builders (“NAHB”) v. Babbitt, a case
brought by the County of San Bernardino, CA, against the FWS. The
County challenged the constitutionality of hospital construction
requirements meant to protect the endangered Delhi Sands FlowerLoving Fly. While there were some disagreements between the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 172.
130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

09__BOTELLO-SAMSON.DOC

Spring 2006]

6/12/2006 11:11 AM

REGULATORY TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO ESA

305

majority and concurring opinions,85 a concise argument upholding
ESA against the Commerce Clause challenge remained.
Most significant was the conclusion that ESA satisfied the
substantial effects test. The D.C. Circuit Court first looked to the
congressional record of the Act, which was not available to the Court
in Lopez, and determined that Congress had envisioned a connection
between the preservation of genetic diversity and interstate
commerce.86 This satisfied one of the factors that the Lopez decision
established for the substantial effects test, but a rational basis for
Congress’ decision was still needed to consider the actions
constitutional. The D.C. Circuit Court argued that Congress could
regulate the taking of endangered species “as an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce because it is the product of
destructive interstate competition, . . . [which] Congress is empowered
to act to prevent.”87 To further satisfy the Lopez criteria for the
substantial effects test, a footnote pointed out the jurisdictional limit
to ESA, stating that the Act only “prevents activities that are likely to
cause the elimination of species.”88 All of these factors were used
together by the D.C. Circuit Court to hold the challenged
enforcement of ESA consistent with the substantial effects test.
According to Jacalyn R. Fleming, “[t]his was a reasonable
interpretation of Lopez. However, since Morrison, [which further
emphasized the need for an activity to be economic in nature to
satisfy the substantial effects test,] the argument that the activity
being regulated need not be economic in nature is more difficult to
make.”89
Faced with the Supreme Court’s reiteration of the economic
components of its substantial effects test, lower courts continued to
find enforcement of ESA to be constitutional by focusing on the
economic and commercial nature of the protection of endangered
species. Shortly after the Morrison decision, the Fourth Circuit Court

85. For example, the majority opinion found the Act protected the channels of interstate
commerce (id. at 1046), whereas the concurring opinion did not. Compare id. at 1048, with id. at
1058. Furthermore, the majority opinion considered endangered species as “potential
resources.” Id. at 1051. However, the concurring opinion considers this “incalculable.” Id. at
1058. For a full conversation on the various opinions in Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, see
Fleming, supra note 67, at 406.
86. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1051.
87. Id. at 1054.
88. Id. at 1052.
89. Fleming, supra note 67, at 511.
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of Appeals heard Gibbs v. Babbitt,90 which involved a FWS regulation
limiting the taking of endangered red wolves on private land. In
considering whether the challenged regulations substantially affected
interstate commerce, the Fourth Circuit Court expansively read the
economic requirements of Lopez and Morrison. As the court noted,
“[a]lthough the connection to economic or commercial activity plays a
central role in whether a regulation will be upheld under the
Commerce Clause, economic activity must be understood in broad
terms.”91 This reading was seen as consistent with Lopez and
Morrison because the activities in those cases were only tenuously
related to economic activity and were in areas traditionally reserved
92
for states’ police powers. With this reading of the substantial effects
test, the Fourth Circuit Court found a plain and direct relationship
between the protection of red wolves and commercial activity:
Farmers were shooting wolves for economic reasons (protecting
livestock), and activities such as tourism, research, and the pelt trade
are directly connected to the wolves.93
More recently, two federal appellate decisions, Rancho Viejo v.
Norton94 and GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton,95 argued before
the Courts of Appeals for the D.C. District and the Fifth Circuit,
respectively, further challenged the constitutionality of the
application of ESA to intrastate species. In Rancho Viejo, the
protection of the endangered arroyo southwestern toad by FWS
conflicted with a proposed real estate development. “Rather than
accept an alternative plan proposed by the Service, Rancho Viejo
filed suit challenging the application of the Endangered Species
Act . . . to its project as an unconstitutional exercise of federal
authority under the Commerce Clause.”96 Likewise, the GDF Realty
conflict involved development plans hampered by the presence of
97
endangered species—six species of cave dwelling invertebrates.
Instead of denying outright the incidental take permits for which the
petitioners applied, FWS communicated to the petitioners that the
90. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
91. Id. at 491.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 492.
94. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
95. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
96. Ranch Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1064.
97. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 625 (referring to the Bee Creek Cave Harvestman, the Bone
Creek Harvestman, the Tooth Cave Pseudoscorpion, the Tooth Cave Spider, the Tooth Cave
Ground Beetle, and the Kretschmarr Cave Mold Beetle).
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proposed development would result in a take, and the permits would
be denied. However, no denials were ever issued, effectively
98
preventing petitioners from challenging FWS permit denials. After
being compelled by a district court ruling to either issue the denials or
state alternatives that would allow the permits to be granted,99 FWS
denied the permits and, subsequently, GDF Realty challenged the
100
constitutionality of those actions.
In both cases, lower court decisions stating that the application of
ESA to intrastate species is within the bounds of Congress’
101
Commerce Clause powers were affirmed. Interestingly, “the courts
used very different rationales in coming to their conclusions—the
Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the reasoning used by the D.C.
Circuit. The key distinction between the courts’ rationales is their
diverging definitions of the ‘regulated activity’ for the purposes of
ascertaining the impact on interstate commerce.”102
In Rancho Viejo, the D.C. Circuit Court defined the activity
regulated by ESA in this instance to be the actual construction of the
housing development, which the court further described as a clearly
economic enterprise. Thus, the Lopez emphasis on economic
activities being more suitable for the substantial effects test was
103
satisfied. The D.C. Circuit Court found neither a jurisdictional
element to ESA, nor congressional findings connecting housing
development construction to interstate commerce. The court,
however, declared that these factors, when absent, are not fatal to a
104
substantial effects argument. The more than attenuated relationship
between interstate commerce and commercial development provided
the court a rational basis to accept the existence of such a
relationship.105
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit declared that the regulated activity
“is plaintiffs’ alleged take of the Cave Species by their planned
106
development of the Property.” While the court recognized the
essential connection between the construction of the proposed

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 626.
GDF Realty, Ltd. v. United States, No. 98-CV-772 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
Id. at 624; Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1064.
Van Loh, supra note 73, at 461-62.
Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068.
Id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1069-70.
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633 (emphasis added).
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development and subsequent taking of endangered species, the court
specified that, although “the effect of regulation of ESA takes may be
to prohibit such development . . . , Congress, through ESA, is not
directly regulating commercial development.”107
The Fifth Circuit provided two arguments to justify its decision
to treat the taking of cave species as the regulated activity, as opposed
to the actual development of the habitat. First, the court argued that
classifying the commercial development of the property as the
regulated activity, “would ‘effectually obliterate’ the limiting purpose
108
of the Commerce Clause.” Given the clearly economic nature of
real estate development, such an interpretation would enable
109
Congress to “pile inference upon inference” and infinitely extend its
constitutional power, resulting in a jurisprudence under which the
110
facial challenges in Lopez and Morrison would fail. Second, the
court was concerned that such an analysis would establish a strict
foundation of congressional authority over commercial actors, while
leaving noncommercial actors unaffected.111 This would be
inconsistent with Congress’ intent in ESA, an act that protects
endangered species from commercial and noncommercial activities,
such as “a homeowner clearing brush from her property . . . [or a]
lone hiker in the woods who may inadvertently harm an endangered
species.”112
In arguing that the direct regulation of the taking of endangered
species substantially affects interstate commerce, the Fifth Circuit
provided both direct and indirect effects. Regarding direct effects on
interstate commerce, the court argued that a substantial degree of
interstate travel of research scientist exists for these species, but
found claims for the possibility of future economic use of these
species to be too hypothetical and too attenuated.113 Although the
cave species have no commercial value,114 the taking of the cave
species would indirectly, but substantially, affect interstate commerce
when one considers the aggregate of such a taking with all other such

107.
108.
(1937)).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 634.
Id. (citing Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 635.
Id. at 634.
Van Loh, supra note 73, at 480.
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 637-38.
Id. at 625.
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takings. ESA, as a whole, is economic in nature, given Congress’
substantial concern with the commercial impacts, among others, of
115
species extinction. The regulation of even commercially valueless
species is an essential component of that regulatory scheme, because
the role such species play ecologically is key to ESA’s central concern
116
for ecosystem health. For this reason, the Fifth Circuit argued that
the regulation of the taking of the cave species passed Commerce
Clause muster.
The Supreme Court has not evaluated Commerce Clause
challenges to ESA, either facially or as pertaining to specific instances
of its implementation. Defenders of ESA may consider this a victory
by default, albeit a temporary one. However, even in an atmosphere
of heightened scrutiny for acts of Congress, lower courts have been
quite reluctant to rule that the regulation of endangered species is
outside of Congress’ constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause. While dissenting opinions were issued in NAHB and Gibbs,
those dissents focused on a perceived lack of a connection between
interstate commerce and the specific challenged activities, but still
allowed for an “obvious economic character and impact . . . with
other wildlife resources.”117 The lower courts’ reluctance to declare
the enforcement of ESA unconstitutional on Commerce Clause
grounds should neither be overstated nor guaranteed, as more
Commerce Clause challenges continue to be heard in lower courts.118
However, the grounds of precedence may not be as frozen as
often perceived. The Supreme Court, despite issuing in a new era of
heightened scrutiny, has demonstrated a willingness to strongly
construct federal commerce power against state power, even in policy
119
areas frequently considered as traditional state powers.
Furthermore, a judicial environment full of precedence supporting
ESA against Commerce Clause challenges may direct challengers to
other avenues perceived as more inviting to challenges to ESA.

115. Id. at 639.
116. Id. at 640.
117. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 508 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Fleming, supra note 67, at
512-14, 518.
118. See, e.g., Drake v. Norton, No. 04-CV-01147 (C.D. Utah 2004) (case dismissed Oct. 28,
2005).
119. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (declaring that state laws prohibiting
the direct sale of wine from out of state producers violate the Commerce Clause and the WebbKenyon Act); Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005) (declaring the Commerce Clause enables
Congress to outlaw production of medical marijuana even where state law allows it).
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IV. JURISPRUDENCE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
The origins of regulatory takings lie in the Fifth Amendment
protection of property rights, which prohibits “private property
be[ing] taken for public use, without just compensation.”120 This
constitutional protection clearly requires compensation when the
government uses its eminent domain powers to physically seize
private property for public use. However, the Amendment has been
increasingly interpreted to include nonphysical takings of property,
where regulations leave property in the hands of the owner but either
remove economic value or particular types of property rights.
When a property owner believes that such regulations have
basically taken his or her property, the owner can argue that the
government action does not properly serve a public purpose, is not
rationally related to the government’s stated ends, imposes an unfair
private burden in the achievement of such public ends, and/or has not
121
satisfied basic procedural requirements. In such instances, the
owner should be compensated for his or her loss. With the high
incidence of endangered species on private lands and the often high
level of costs needed to protect such species, the potential for
conflicts between the enforcement of ESA and private property rights
is rather great.122 While “the legal tests of validity and invalidity are
indeed not clear,”123 an overview of the Supreme Court’s selfadmittedly inconsistent regulatory takings jurisprudence124 is possible
and can help put that potential into perspective.
Although the ability of property owners to seek compensation
for government intrusion upon their property dates as far back as the
Bill of Rights, such litigation has been rare throughout the majority of
American history. Indeed, “[f]ew cases were litigated under the
clause, and there was no such thing as a ‘regulatory taking’ . . .
although state and local governments had been regulating private
125
land uses, sometimes quite stringently, since the colonial era.” In
the rare occurrence of a regulatory taking claim, early federal courts
were unwilling to engage in judicial review under the Fifth
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1037-38.
122. Robert Innes et al., Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on
Private Lands, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 35-52 (1998).
123. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1051.
124. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
125. DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 155 (2002) (citations omitted).
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Amendment. In 1887, a Kansas statute prohibiting the production of
alcohol was challenged before the Supreme Court as a taking of
126
private property. Although the Court emphasized that such a
remedy should be sought in the state courts,127 the Court also declared
that the “right to compensation . . . of private property taken for
public uses is foreign to the subject of preventing or abating public
nuisances.”128 The earliest regulatory takings cases also demonstrate
an acknowledgement of the limits of private property and a
recognition of a nuisance exception to the takings clause.
The Supreme Court’s first effort at qualifying the nuisance
129
exception occurred in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 1922. This
decision declared that the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute
requiring coal companies to leave enough coal as not to threaten the
surface structure, constituted a compensable taking. Takings
jurisprudence would henceforth be seen as a balancing act focusing
on the “extent of the diminution.”130 While still providing nothing
more than vague generalities, Pennsylvania Coal established the
regulatory takings framework under which future conflicts would be
fought. “The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”131
Although the Supreme Court continues to recognize the
simultaneous claims of property owners to their property rights and
governments to their need to regulate property, the Court has
articulated tests to measure this balance more specifically than simply
asking whether the state has “gone too far.” After seeing its
regulatory takings jurisprudence as being based on “essentially ad
132
hoc, factual inquiries,” the Court declared that it had historically
“been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when
‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”133

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Id. at 672.
St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App. 48, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1876); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
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The Court, therefore, established the three-pronged Penn
Central test: Whether government action constitutes a compensable
taking depends on (1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2) its
interference with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the nature
of the government’s action, ranging from outright invasion to
134
protection of the common good. These tests are, of course, heavily
dependent upon interpretation and have given the Court ample
opportunity to produce rulings with a high degree of variance:
First, the Court has defined each factor in a variety of ways, without
acknowledging the shifts in definition. Second, it is difficult to
predict what weight the Court will give to each factor. At different
times the Court has actually regarded each one of these so-called
135
“factors” as dispositive of whether a taking occurred.

Two years after establishing its Penn Central test, the Court
established a new, two-pronged takings test, referred to as the Agins
136
test. This test required the state to “substantially advance legitimate
state interests” and to not “den[y] an owner economically viable use
137
of his land.” The purpose of this new test and its relationship to
Penn Central was not clarified, and subsequent use of the test failed
to establish a proper interpretation of both parts of the Agins test and
their relationship to one another.138 Furthermore, the Court
demonstrated confusion regarding the priority of each test over the
other.
In a series of cases heard in the 1980s, the Court considered
whether a number of property limiting regulations affected takings. In
1981, the Supreme Court evaluated a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977.139 In determining whether environmental regulations that
limited the extent of coal mining essentially took property from
owners of coal mineral rights, the Court used the Agins test, asking
whether the “economically viable use” of the land is denied to the
140
owner. Additionally, in a partial dissent in Pennell v. City of San
Jose, Justice Scalia argued that the Agins test should be used to find a

134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
135. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I—A
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1317 (1989).
136. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
137. Id. at 260.
138. Peterson, supra note 135, at 1328-30.
139. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
140. Id. at 296.
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taking in certain rent control ordinances.141 However, in cases dealing
with zoning ordinances142 and pesticide data disclosure,143 the Court
relied on Penn Central.
Despite such inconsistencies, certain trends are evident in this
period of regulatory takings jurisprudence. The most obvious trend is
a strong spirit of judicial deference to lawmaking bodies when
determining whether a regulation or statute provides a public use, an
inquiry required by both the Fifth Amendment and the first prong of
the Agins test. While determining whether the regulation of private
property satisfied the public use requirement, the Court regarded the
term “public use” as coterminous with state police powers, and
deferred to the reasoning of state legislatures as better able to
144
determine whether such a requirement has been met. The Court
further demonstrated a strong commitment to the ripeness standard,
145
requiring that cases demonstrate a “concrete controversy.” In
addition, property owners were required to receive a final decision
from the agency and seek a possible variance to the regulation, which
would allow the public good to be sought while leaving the property
owner with economic productivity.146 One consequence of the Court’s
focus on ripeness in regulatory takings cases is that the strategic use
of the Takings Clause as the foundation for constitutional challenges
to entire pieces of regulation has not been successful.
Victories have been achieved lately, however, at the Supreme
Court level by advocates of strong private property rights. With these
victories comes a jurisprudential shift in regulatory takings cases
visible in four areas: (1) the level of judicial deference, (2) the role of
economics, (3) the understanding of the nature of property, and (4)
the degree of scrutiny applied to questions of ripeness. This string of
recent cases, beginning in the late 1980s, has been argued in an
atmosphere less deferential to state legislatures and agencies, which
seek to create and enforce policies that limit the use of private
property.

141. 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988).
142. See, e.g., Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191
(1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986).
143. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S.
at 1014.
145. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295; see also Pennell, 485 U.S. at 10.
146. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348.
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In 1987, the Court considered whether a requirement by the
California Coastal Commission that a specific property owner provide
lateral beach access as a condition to a building permit for a parcel of
beachfront property affected a taking.147 Instead of interpreting the
Commission’s discretion as coterminous with its power to protect the
common good in coastal land, the Court evaluated the wisdom of the
Commission’s policy, and determined that a lateral easement served
neither the function of beach access nor the elimination of
psychological barriers to such access, as claimed by the Commission.148
Five years later, the Court would provide a clear justification for
its willingness to second guess the policy decisions of legislatures and
agencies when those decisions limit a property owner’s use of his or
149
her property. Such limits are generally justified as serving not only a
public purpose, but also the essential purpose of preventing harm to
the public and its property. The Court argued, however, that “[s]ince
such a justification can be formulated in practically every case, this
150
amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.”
Therefore, the Supreme Court has taken on the self-imposed
responsibility of doing “more than insist upon artful harm-preventing
characterizations.”151
Although the Court became decidedly less likely to facially
accept a state’s argument that it was preventing a public harm and,
therefore, was not constitutionally required to compensate the
property owner, this did not mean that states were prohibited entirely
from such actions. The Court continues to recognize the limited
nature of property rights, and further recognizes uncompensated
limits can be placed upon property “if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use
152
interests were not part of his title to begin with.” In other words, the
right to endanger the public is not part of the bundle of rights in a
specific piece of property; therefore, when such action is regulated
away, property owners deserve no compensation, because what was
taken was not the property owner’s in the first place.
The recent willingness of the Supreme Court to limit property by
such means, however, should not be overstated. The Court has stated
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 839-40.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
Id. at 1025, n.12.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
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that “[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”153 In addition to
limiting the nature of harms legislatures and agencies can declare, the
Court also established standards by which policies aimed at
protecting the public from such harms could limit property rights.154
While prior decisions looked for a rational basis to justify policies that
limit private property, the Dolan Court introduced a stricter scrutiny
for evaluating such policies.155 Short of supplying a precise
mathematical calculation, the Court now requires a policy to
demonstrate a “rough proportionality” between the nature of the
prevented harm and the extent of the requirements placed upon
property owners.156
Increased scrutiny placed upon governments and their ability to
limit the use of private property is indicative of a Court that has
shifted its understanding of the nature of property and increased the
significance of economic factors within that understanding. While the
Penn Central and Agins tests stress both economic factors and the
nature of regulatory action, including that which is regulated and the
manner in which it is regulated, the Rehnquist Court increased the
emphasis on the economic impacts of regulation in determining the
existence of a regulatory taking, much in the way that it increased its
emphasis on the economic nature of legislation in its Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.157
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court took a
step toward clarifying the relationship between economic and
noneconomic factors in regulatory takings cases.158 While property
rights remain limited in the face of background principles of the
common good, a per se taking occurs when regulation deprives the
159
owner of all economically viable uses of the property. The Court
was particularly interested in protecting property in land, arguing that
the “historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture” is inconsistent with the

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1027.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994).
Id. at 391.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-30.
Id. at 1020.
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elimination by regulation of all economic value,160 that is, without
compensation.
The Court does give examples of land uses that could be legally
prohibited, even to the point of a total economic loss, which would
not require compensation.161 Such regulations limit the use of
property to those uses that do not harm others or their property and
simply “make the implication of those background principles of
162
nuisance and property law explicit.” As stated above, however, such
limitations on property cannot be “newly legislated,”163 leaving it
unclear how a legislature can make background principles explicit,
while also strengthening takings claims by property owners who can
demonstrate a complete economic loss.
This increased focus on the role of economic factors in regulatory
takings cases is correlated with a shift in the Court’s doctrine on the
nature of property. Throughout the history of its regulatory takings
jurisprudence, the Court has sought the balancing of private property
rights and public interests. One of the most significant facets of
property rights considered by the Court is the right to exclude others,
which the Court has regarded as “one of the most essential sticks in
164
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”
In cases involving outright physical occupation, the Court has
generally required the use of the states’ eminent domain powers and
the compensation of property owners.165 In cases involving transition
across private property, instead of physical occupation on such
property, to guarantee public access to some public good, the private
property right has been weighted more heavily by the Court in recent
decisions.166 Furthermore, the Court has regarded development as
167
land’s “essential use,” requiring governments to provide stronger
defenses for public and environmental protections.
During the aforementioned period of judicial deference in
regulatory takings cases, the chronological order of the acquisition of
property and the imposition of a regulatory limit on the use of

160. Id. at 1028.
161. Id. at 1029.
162. Id. at 1030.
163. Id. at 1029.
164. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
165. See id. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
166. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994).
167. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
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property affected the legitimacy of a taking claim. Acquiring property
under pre-existing regulations was generally understood as
preventing the owner from having reasonable investment-backed
expectations.168 This so-called “notice rule” functions to define the
background principals of property alluded to in Lucas by claiming
that, “the underlying background principles of property must include
all existing regulatory constraints at the time of acquisition.”169
Under such jurisprudence, property rights are positive rights,
with origins in political processes, and the Takings Clause exists as a
foundational law that governs the further maintenance of those rights.
This position, however, has been recently challenged by the Court,
which has stated that if the notice rule exception is seen as absolute,
then “the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of
its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how
extreme or unreasonable [and a] State would be allowed, in effect, to
170
put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.” By explicitly
rejecting a Hobbesian understanding of the relationship between the
171
state and property, and accepting a Lockean construction, the Court
has placed property rights into the realm of natural rights, which exist
independent of and prior to the state.
It should be stated that the majority in Palazzolo, in keeping the
seemingly required ambiguity found throughout regulatory takings
jurisprudence, provided confusion over the role of the notice rule in a
pair of concurring opinions. While the majority determined that
Palazzolo’s acquisition of the property after the regulations had been
enacted did not proscribe his taking claim, Justices Scalia and
O’Connor disagreed as to the role of chronology more generally.
Justice Scalia argued that timing has no bearing on the question,
claiming that “[a] Penn Central taking . . . is not absolved by the
172
While Justice O’Connor agrees that posttransfer of title.”
enactment acquisition of title is “not talismanic under Penn
173
Central,” she did not appear ready to fully reject the notice rule,
arguing that “the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant

168. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984).
169. James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 31 (2002).
170. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of
[investment-backed] expectations.”174
Finally, rulings in regulatory takings cases by the Rehnquist
Court have potentially altered the environment in which the Court
considers the question of ripeness, or whether a case is ready for
review. The jurisprudence of regulatory takings demonstrates a
tendency of the judiciary to view itself as a last resort to resolving
takings questions, preferring to allow other branches of government
to resolve the issue first. Prior ripeness decisions by the Court have
supported this view, requiring that a taking claimant demonstrate a
concrete controversy175 and a final administrative decision, exhausting
alternative options,176 before the case can be judicially decided on the
merits. By and large, these same rules and requirements have
remained as guidelines for the current Court, and were used to
declare Palazzolo ripe, since “the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations [had] reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”177
Furthermore, subsequent plan filing was not required, according to
the Court, because the “unequivocal nature” of the wetlands
regulations would not have permitted any building in the disputed
area.178
Some view the Palazzolo decision as a shift in the Court’s
ripeness jurisprudence that benefits regulatory taking claimants,
noting “that once a landowner has a meaningful permit application
denied, the burden shifts to the government to indicate what, if any,
179
other uses of the property may be available.” There is little
evidence supporting this position, however, and the Court’s focus on
the state’s strict regulations, with little administrative leeway, makes
Palazzolo a “specific ripeness ruling [which] is tied to the facts of the
case and is thus unlikely to have much precedential effect adverse to
180
government officials.”
174. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
175. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981);
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988).
176. See Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).
177. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (quoting Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 186).
178. Id. at 619.
179. Burling, supra note 169, at 23.
180. Timothy J. Dowling, On History, Takings Jurisprudence, and Palazzolo: A Reply to
James Burling, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 65, 84 (2002).
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The ruling in Palazzolo does not fundamentally alter the Court’s
ripeness jurisprudence. In fact, the Court “emphatically reaffirmed its
existing ripeness doctrine as set forth in Williamson County,
MacDonald, and other leading ripeness precedents.”181 Furthermore,
the Court has subsequently defended its ripeness doctrine in light of
claims of temporary takings. Historically, the Court has stated that
temporary restrictions must involve “extraordinary delays” instead of
“mere fluctuations” in value before the claim can achieve ripeness.182
After Palazzolo, the Court ruled that even lengthy and complete
building moratoria can be justified due to “[t]he interest in facilitating
informed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies.”183 Therefore,
despite shifts in the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence that
have placed stricter scrutiny upon governmental actions that seek to
limit private property, the presence of a final administrative decision
must still be present for a taking claim to be considered ripe.
Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the majority’s finding in Palazzolo
that a final decision had been made. Neither can one ignore the
voices of dissenting justices still on the bench in cases where such
claims have been ruled not ripe.184 While the rules of ripeness have
not changed, there is clearly wide disagreement between the
individual justices as to what level of agency action satisfies those
rules, which makes the ripeness doctrine highly susceptible to even
slight changes in justices’ philosophies or the composition of the
Court.
V. REGULATORY TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO ESA
While Commerce Clause and regulatory takings challenges to
ESA may functionally act in political concert seeking the same end—
lessening the federal government’s authority over endangered species
protection—the legal arguments behind each challenge are
fundamentally different. When a Commerce Clause challenge to ESA
is made, plaintiffs argue that, in at least a particular instance, the
enforcement of ESA is outside of the federal government’s authority,
which rests on Congress’ power over interstate commerce. While

181. Id.
182. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980).
183. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 338 (2002).
184. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
and White, J., dissenting); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (Scalia & O’Connor, JJ.,
dissenting); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
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plaintiffs making regulatory takings challenges against ESA may also
question the government’s authority to regulate endangered species,
arguing that it fails to satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment, the inability to make such an argument does not
significantly damage the regulatory takings challenge. “At issue, then,
is not whether the federal government has the authority to protect . . .
[endangered species] under the Endangered Species Act, but whether
it may impose the costs of their protection solely on plaintiffs.”185
Since the focus of such cases centers simultaneously on the
extent of the government’s authority and the expanse of an
individual’s property rights, different relationships between
endangered species and property will invite different regulatory
takings challenges. Such challenges have been made against the
enforcement of ESA under three different types of relationships
between endangered species and property: (1) species as property, (2)
species as a threat to property, and (3) the regulation of property to
protect endangered species. Such cases have been heard only before
lower courts, not before the Supreme Court.
A. Endangered Species as Property
Since the ESA includes both “capture” and “collect” within its
statutory definition of “take,”186 one would assume that regulatory
challenges involving endangered species as property would be rather
rare. After all, legal prohibition of such ownership would establish an
easily recognized background principle to ownership and diminish
any reasonable investment-backed expectation. One would have to
challenge for the right to own an endangered species before it could
become property that was taken by regulation. If, however, the
particular species was already owned prior to it being protected, then
ESA extends only to limitations on its ownership, prohibiting such
actions as keeping the species for commercial use187 or subjecting the
188
species to interstate commerce.
In 1976, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case
189
involving this rare set of circumstances. In United States v. Kepler,
the respondent challenged his arrest for transporting an endangered
185.
2001).
186.
187.
188.
189.

Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
Id. § 1538(b)(1).
Id. § 1538(a)(1)(E).
531 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976).
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leopard from Florida to Kentucky, as well as the subsequent seizure
of the animal by the Department of the Interior. The respondent
argued that ESA was unconstitutional because its prohibition of such
an attempted sale had the effect of taking his property without just
compensation.190 In a per curium decision, the Sixth Circuit Court
pointed out that ESA does allow for the transportation and sale of
endangered species, but only for acceptable scientific and ecological
purposes, and if permits are obtained from the Secretary.191 Kepler’s
192
actions did not qualify for this exception. Furthermore, the court
argued that ESA “does not effect an unconstitutional taking of
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because the
statute does not prevent all sales of endangered wildlife, but only
those sales in interstate or foreign commerce.”193 Since the court
focused on the interstate nature of this particular case, “it is unclear
whether the court would apply the same test to other scenarios—for
instance, one involving only intrastate activity.”194 In the unlikely
future event that an individual might own individual species at the
time it is declared endangered, future courts might interpret ESA’s
prohibition against the ownership of animals for commercial
purposes195 as a deprivation of economically viable use and, therefore,
196
a per se taking.
B. Endangered Species as Threats to Property
The ESA, together with a larger regulatory scheme intended for
the protection of wildlife, makes the ownership of endangered
species, and subsequent regulatory takings challenges to limits on that
property, unlikely. Far more common are situations where a
perceived conflict exists between the public’s interest in the
preservation of species and individual interest in a separate form of
property. One such manifestation involves property owners
protecting their property from species that the public has sought to
protect. Historically, such conflicts have been quite common.
Prior to the enactment of ESA, several cases were litigated
seeking compensation from the government for damages done to
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id.
Fleming, supra note 67, at 528.
16 U.S.C. § 1538(b) (2000).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
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private property by species protected by early federal wildlife
statutes, such as the Migratory Bird Act,197 or by state game laws.198
The basic argument brought by property owners in such cases is
generally that the action or inaction of a particular government entity
has one or several consequences, including, but not limited to, failure
to protect private property, creation of a property damaging nuisance,
engagement in actions which result in foreseeable damages, damage
caused by an entity which is owned by the government, and evasion
of responsibility by the government through inaction.199 Such
arguments, however, are unpersuasive. The courts have ruled that the
government is not responsible for compensating damages made to
property by protected species. A strong precedence has been
established by the courts: Since wildlife is not property, the
government is not responsible for the actions taken by wild animals;200
201
such actions are, in fact, “incidental to the state regulation;” and
legislatures make better judges of the efficacy of their wildlife
programs, thus making them better suited to weigh the public benefits
of wildlife protection against foreseeable property losses.202
Such precedence proved influential when claimants challenged
ESA in federal court, arguing that protections for endangered species
resulted in property owners not being able to protect their property
and they should, therefore, be compensated for their losses. This was
the argument in Christy v. Hodel, a case in which the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard an argument that ESA regulations, aimed at
protecting grizzly bears, prevented ranchers from protecting their
203
sheep, thus resulting in a Fifth Amendment taking. In its opinion,
the court relied heavily on a decision from the Tenth Circuit two
years earlier, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel.204 This
earlier case involved an argument similar to that in Christy, but
focused on the potential property rights impact that implementation

197. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000); Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950); Bishop
v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 449 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
198. Barrett v. New York, 220 N.Y. 423 (N.Y. 1917) (challenged that state laws protecting
beavers resulted in damage to wooded property); Jordan v. Alaska, 681 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1984) (challenged state game laws regarding bears resulted in a loss in property interest in
a hunted moose carcass).
199. Sickman, 184 F.2d at 617-18.
200. Barrett, 220 N.Y. at 430; Sickman, 184 F.2d at 618.
201. Jordan, 681 P.2d at 350, n.3.
202. Barrett, 220 N.Y. at 427-28; Bishop, 126 F. Supp. at 452-53.
203. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
204. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
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of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971205 might
impose on grazing interests. While Mountain States was not directly
decided under ESA, it considers ESA and the Wild Horses Act to be
analogous statutes.206 Although the court acknowledges ESA to be
“more pervasive, more sweeping, and more restrictive,”207 the court’s
analysis of the regulatory taking claim against the Wild Horses Act
208
would still prove useful in Christy.
In Mountain States, the standards and tests of regulatory takings
cases were applied directly to regulatory actions designed to protect
certain species—in this case, wild horses—that have caused damage
to private property. Recognizing that “[t]here is no abstract or fixed
point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause
209
becomes appropriate,” the court attempted to determine which
direction the balance should lean between property rights in grazing
access and public interest in wild horse protection. To do so, the court
relied on both Agins and Penn Central criteria. To satisfy the Agins
test, the court argued that the preservation of wild horses advances a
legitimate state interest on aesthetic and biodiversity grounds, and
petitioners never challenged that there was a denial of economically
viable use. Instead, petitioners argued that the loss alone justified
compensation.210 In applying the petitioners’ claims to the standards
set forth in Penn Central, the court stated that the regulations and the
subsequent economic impact on property value, when compared to
the property as a whole, do not interfere with investment-backed
expectations. The property owners still maintain the investment value
of the property, and could still fence the property to keep the wild
horses out.211
Relying heavily on the analysis in Mountain States, the Ninth
Circuit focused its analysis in Christy on two separate components of
the Takings Clause: the requirements of due process and just
compensation. The court began its due process analysis by
determining the standard that should be applied in assessing the
regulations prohibiting the plaintiffs from shooting grizzly bears to

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1427-28.
Id. at 1428.
Christy, 857 F.2d at 1334-35.
Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1429.
Id. at 1430; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
Mountain States, 799 F.2d. at 1431.
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protect their sheep.212 If such a prohibition allegedly violated a
constitutionally protected right, then the standard of strict scrutiny
would be applied. The government would need to prove that its
pursued interest, the protection of grizzly bears, is more important
than the plaintiffs’ property rights. If, however, the allegedly
impinged right was less than fundamental, all the government would
have to prove is the existence of a legitimate state end, rationally
related to the regulation.213
The court determined that the right in question is the “right to
kill federally protected wildlife in defense of property,”214 which was
determined not to be a fundamental right on two grounds. First, since
ESA provides exceptions to its prohibitions if the person is defending
his or her own life, or someone else’s life, but provides no such
exception for the protection of property, Congress must not have
considered such a property right to be as essential as a right to
personal self defense.215 Second, “[t]he U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly recognize a right to kill federally protected wildlife in
216
defense of property.” While the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
Supreme Court has inferred such constitutional rights,217 the Ninth
Circuit also referred to an expressed reluctance on the part of the
218
Supreme Court to do so. Ultimately, heeding “the Supreme Court’s
admonition . . . [to] exercise restraint in creating new definitions of
substantive due process, . . . [the Ninth Circuit] decline[d] plaintiffs’
invitation to construe the fifth amendment as guaranteeing the right
to kill federally protected wildlife in defense of property.”219
Turning to a regulatory takings analysis, the court first
determined whether the alleged taking of property was a physical
taking, as argued by plaintiffs, or if it was more appropriately
understood as a potential regulatory taking, as argued by counsel for
the Department of the Interior. The court concluded that any
physical taking of the plaintiffs’ property in sheep was performed not
by the state, but by the bears.220 As the government does not own the

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Christy, 857 F.2d at 1329.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(3) (2000).
Christy, 857 F.2d at 1329.
Id. at 1330. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Christy, 857 F.2d at 1330. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Christy, 857 F.2d at 1330.
Id. at 1334.
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bears, nor is it responsible for their actions, there is no taking of
property attributable to government actions.221
Relying on precedence stating that property damage caused by
protected species does not constitute a regulatory taking,222 the court
ruled that while the goal of the Fifth Amendment is “to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
223
whole,” the regulations in this case do not “‘force’ plaintiffs to bear
any burden. The losses sustained by the plaintiffs are the incidental,
and by no means inevitable, result of reasonable regulation in the
public interest.”224 It is the incidental nature of these regulations—that
they regulate the taking of endangered species instead of the use of
property—that has insulated ESA from regulatory takings claims
founded on alleged damage done to property by protected species.
While federal courts have not attached regulatory takings to conflicts
concerning actions taken by property owners to protect their property
from endangered species, one court has attached regulatory takings to
regulations aimed at protecting endangered species from the effects
of the use of private property.225
C. Regulation of Property to Protect Endangered Species
As discussed above, judicial verdicts to Commerce Clause
challenges to ESA may be impacted by whether the court elects to
view the regulated activity as the taking of endangered species or the
226
economic activity that results in the taking. If the regulated activity
is considered to be the economic activity, such as development
construction, Congress’ authority might invasively extend to any and
all economic activities, or ESA may prove powerless against
noneconomic activities. Furthermore, if the regulated activity is
considered to be the taking of protected species, then ESA may be
interpreted as failing to achieve the substantial effects test.227

221. Id. at 1335. See also Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
222. See e.g., Barrett v. New York, 220 N.Y. 423 (N.Y. 1917); Bishop v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 449 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950); Jordan v.
Alaska, 681 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d
1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
223. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
224. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335. See also supra note 222 and accompanying text.
225. Tulare Lake Basin Water Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
226. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
227. Van Loh, supra note 73, at 480.
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A similar situation is found in ESA cases involving regulatory
takings challenges. When ESA is used to prevent the direct taking of
an endangered species, even if that taking is to protect property, ESA
has proven to be insulated from claims of regulatory takings: The
regulations were incidental to the property rights, and the property
owner still had ways to protect his or her property in ways that did
not violate ESA.228 However, if the regulations in question are
designed to protect the endangered species from otherwise legal
activities involved in the use of one’s property, the incidental nature
of the relation of the regulation to the property no longer holds.
While the purpose of the regulation is the same, for example, to
protect an endangered species, its impact on property is generally a
far more central and essential component of the regulation. While
“ESA is not a land law, . . . in many cases the only efficacious way to
protect an endangered species is to protect habitat.”229
This is the most conceivable form of conflict between property
rights and endangered species. It is only in this area, where a
judicially determined constitutional limit has been found, which
requires compensation for property owners for losses attributed to
enforcement of ESA. This should not be too surprising, however,
considering that it is in this area that property interests and
endangered species concerns are most interwoven. Congress
recognized that such conflicts would be inevitable—that questions
about endangered species invariably become questions about
property—and designed ESA to at least address that concern.
Section 5 of ESA authorizes various federal departments “to
acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or interest
therein,”230 for the purpose of species protection as part of a special
program within those agencies. Some property rights advocates have
argued that Section 5 indicates “that Congress intended to address
the problem of habitat modification exclusively through federal land
acquisition.”231 According to this position, Congress had rational
reasons for limiting ESA’s regulatory power over habitats in such a
manner. Not only does “[e]nforcing the just compensation
requirement always [reduce] the appetite that government officials

228. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335.
229. Bruce Babbitt, ESA and Private Property: The Endangered Species Act and ‘Takings’:
A Call for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 360 (1994).
230. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (2000).
231. Sweet Home Ch. of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 806 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D.D.C.
1992); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Ch. of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995).
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have for private property, . . . [but it also] forces government experts
to rank the habitat for preservation in accordance with the objectives
232
of its program.” For these reasons, regulatory takings plaintiffs
argue that ESA regulations that limit one’s use of private property
are “not only contrary to the spirit and intent of ESA, [but they] also
contradict the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against government
takings of private property for public use without payment of just
compensation.”233
Two recent cases tested the above argument before the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims. The first of these cases, heard by the
Federal Claims Court in 2001, is Tulare Lake Basin Water District v.
United States.234 Significantly, it is the first case where a federal court
ruled that the enactment of ESA constituted a taking. The case deals
with ESA protections for two species of fish: the delta smelt and the
winter-run Chinook salmon.235 These species of fish rely on water
supplies that also feed California’s private water needs. Through this
system, the State Water Resources Control Board, the Bureau of
Reclamations, and the state Department of Water Resources issue
and distribute permits to county water districts.236 These permits are
for specific water entitlement allotments, and are based on the
contingency that the state cannot be held liable for shortages beyond
its control.237 Not to threaten the existence of the two endangered fish
species, the agencies adopted a “reasonable and prudent alternative”
(“RPA”), which “restricted the time and manner in which water
could be pumped . . . , thereby limiting the water otherwise available
238
to the water distribution systems.”
The water districts argued “that their contractually-conferred
right to the use of water was taken from them when the federal
government imposed water use restrictions under the Endangered
239
Species Act,” and sought compensation for their property in water
rights. The court considered three arguments to determine whether
the water districts had a compensable property interest taken from
232. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24-25,
Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859 (Lexis).
233. Brief of the Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3,
Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859 (Lexis).
234. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
235. Id. at 314.
236. Id. at 314-15.
237. Id. at 315.
238. Id. at 316.
239. Id. at 314.
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them. First, the court asked whether the contract that the water
districts had with the various agencies was appropriated, or simply
240
frustrated. Next, the court determined whether any background
principles had preempted the plaintiffs’ property title claims.241
Finally, the court applied a Penn Central test to the economic losses
242
incurred by the plaintiffs.
To determine what actually happened to the water district’s
property rights upon enactment of the ESA regulations, the Claims
Court articulated its understanding of contractual rights. This analysis
relied heavily upon a distinction between the contract, which is an
obligation to perform some task, and the subject matter of the
243
contract, or in this case, water. Defendants argued that if the
contract right “remains separate and distinct”244 from the contract’s
subject matter, as the defendants argued was the case here, then “the
limitations imposed by the RPA’s represent a legitimate exercise of
federal authority that does no more than frustrate . . . plaintiff’s rights
245
in water.” In other words, the contract only required the agencies to
give the district access to a specified amount of water. If the water is
not there to be accessed, the contract is still intact.
The court, however, disagreed with this assessment. The court
argued that the contract transferred from the state to end-users title
for exclusive use for a specified amount of water.246 Because the
contract was not for access to water, but for water itself, any removal
of water from that contractually specified amount appropriates the
contract to the state, making “plaintiff’s contract rights in the water’s
use . . . superior to all competing interests.”247
Defendants also argued that the plaintiffs’ contract rights, like all
property rights, are couched in and limited by certain background
principles of ownership, such as “the public trust doctrine, the
doctrine of reasonable use, and common law principles of nuisance,
248
all of which provide for the protection of fish and wildlife.” The

240.
241.
242.
243.
(1923).
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 318-20.
Id. at 317. See also Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510-11
Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id. at 320.
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court acknowledged that the rights of the districts to the use of the
water required that they use it in a manner consistent with these
background principles. “The difficulty with defendant’s argument,
however, is that the water allocation scheme . . . specifically allowed
for the allocations of water defendant now seeks to deem
249
unreasonable.” Framing its argument in terms of judicial deference,
the court stated that if the water allotments had to be lowered to keep
the districts’ water usage from harming the endangered fish or
violating certain background principles of ownership, it would be up
to the agencies to make that determination and, most importantly,
put it in the contract. The agency, however, did neither.250
Although the court set out to assess the plaintiffs’ loss of water
rights via a Penn Central analysis focusing specifically on the
regulations’ economic impact and interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations,251 such analysis was never performed
because the court found such an analysis to be unnecessary.252 The
court determined the case involved a physical taking, which is
accompanied by a different set of Fifth Amendment requirements
than a regulatory taking. When a court determines that a regulation
that limits the use of private property functionally amounts to a
physical taking of the property, compensation has often been
required, regardless of the extent to which public ends are met.253
“The regulatory taking doctrine, on the other hand, applies to
government actions that prevent a property owner from making a
particular use of his or her property that otherwise would be
254
permissible.”
The Claims Court was presented with arguments to consider this
case under a regulatory takings doctrine. These arguments against the
application of the physical taking per se rule focused on two Penn
Central factors: the limited reasonable expectations a contract holder
could have in light of regulatory background principles, and the less255
than-complete economic losses suffered by the plaintiffs. This
argument for the defendants highlighted that the federal government

249. Id. at 321.
250. Id. at 324.
251. Id. at 318.
252. Id. at 318-20.
253. Id.
254. Brief of the Natural Heritage Institute & the Environmental Law Foundation as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendants at 30, Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (No. 98-101L).
255. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318.
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did not “[assert] a proprietary interest in the water . . . in derogation of
all other private interests,” but instead “merely regulated the timing
and rate of . . . [the] appropriation of water,” which left the plaintiffs
with the ability “to use the remainder of those rights ‘in gainful
fashion.’”256
While defendants argued that “[a] usufructuary interest in water
is simply not susceptible to physical possession, much less invasion or
occupation,”257 the court sided with plaintiffs on this issue by stating
that, “[i]n the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—the
hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right
itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is to the use of the water.”258
Even though the economic loss suffered by the contract holder was “a
fraction of the master contract’s overall value,”259 the court held that
“the government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of
the contract rights with regard to that water and totally displaced the
contract holder.”260 The court’s application of a physical taking status
to Tulare Lake, and with it a categorical granting of the right to
compensation, demonstrates the key role that the determination of
property baselines plays in regulatory takings cases.
One issue discussed in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, but not fully
explored, was how courts should interpret the base property from
which regulations appropriate in cases involving regulatory takings,
or as the Court puts it, determining “what is the proper denominator
in the takings fraction.”261 At issue in Palazzolo was whether
regulations that would not allow development in wetland parcels of
property could result in a Lucas per se taking of the entirety of that
portion of the property, or whether allowable construction on upland
portions must be included, thus preventing claims of an economic
wipeout. In Palazzolo, the majority opinion states that the remaining
presence of the upland section prevents a ruling of a categorical
262
taking.
This approach remains consistent with the Court’s
traditional jurisprudence regarding property baselines in takings
cases, which “does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments

256. Brief of the Natural Heritage Institution, supra note 254, at 32-33 (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978)).
257. Id. at 31.
258. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319.
259. Id. at 318-19.
260. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
261. 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
262. Id.
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and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated.”263 The Tulare Lake court, however, viewed
the property claim abrogated by the government as separate from the
water rights as a whole, which is an essential component to the court’s
physical taking construction.264
The second case to bring a regulatory takings challenge to
property controlling regulations of ESA is currently waiting to be
heard before the Court of Federal Claims. As mentioned above, the
2003 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in GDF Realty
Investments v. Norton found that FWS regulation of intrastate cave
species was consistent with Congress’ Commerce Clause power.265
While the plaintiffs in GDF Realty failed to convince the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals with their Commerce Clause challenge, that
challenge was one of two challenges made by the plaintiffs to the
federal courts regarding this specific conflict. Apart from challenging
ESA’s implementation as beyond the scope of Congress’ commerce
powers, the plaintiffs also challenged the implementation as an
uncompensated and unconstitutional taking of their property.266
On May 10, 2004, the Court of Federal Claims ordered this case
stayed pending final resolution of the Commerce Clause challenge
267
discussed above. After the Fifth Circuit ruled that the government’s
actions passed Commerce Clause scrutiny, the plaintiffs appealed the
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Their petition for a writ of
certiorari was denied on June 13, 2005.268 With that judicial obstacle
out of the way, the Court of Federal Claims can proceed with hearing
arguments for and against compensation for the economic impacts of
the FWS’s implementation of ESA to protect six species of
subterranean invertebrates.
VI. ASSESSING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
CHALLENGES TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Although regulatory takings challenges to ESA have been
incredibly rare,269 the sudden success of the challenge in Tulare Lake,
263. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
264. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319.
265. 326 F.3d 622, 643-44 (5th Cir. 2003).
266. Id. at 626-27.
267. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, No. 99-CV-513 (Fed. Cl. 2004).
268. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 125 S. Ct. 2898, 2899 (2005).
269. Babbit, supra note 229, at 360 (Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, reacting
to allegations of “egregious abuse” under ESA, expressed some surprise that as of 1994 “there
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combined with the future hearing of GDF Realty, indicates a possible
shift in that trend. If the sudden emergence of two cases in one court
indicates a change in litigious strategies aimed at challenging the
implementation of ESA, then two questions arise. First, why, only
after more than thirty years of enforcement, during a time span that
overlaps the above described evolution of regulatory takings
jurisprudence, are regulatory takings challenges being made? Second,
how successful could such challenges eventually be?
The short answer to the first question could focus on the sporadic
nature of regulatory takings jurisprudence, which the Supreme Court
itself has described as lacking any kind of set formula.270 The resulting
uncertainty may have motivated property owners who have felt
unduly inconvenienced by ESA to pursue more certain legal avenues.
Such an explanation, though, does nothing to explain why regulatory
takings challenges have frequently occurred in other areas. This
section will focus on both of those questions, paying special attention
to the facts in the upcoming GDF Realty challenge.
A. Agins Criteria
The two-pronged Agins test has not experienced the same degree
of judicial popularity as the Penn Central test, and the Supreme Court
has recently ruled that the “substantially advances” component of
Agins suggests a means/ends testing inconsistent with the inquiry into
271
whether property has been taken. This ruling thus indicates that the
Court will likely utilize the Penn Central test in future cases involving
272
less than total diminishment of property value through regulation.
The possibility does remain, however, that the Court could be asked
to evaluate property use regulations, wherein “the failure of a
regulation to accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be
relevant”273 to general property rights challenges to the government’s
authority to enact specific property restrictions. Although now
considered outside the realm of regulatory takings determinations,
challenges to the asserted public purpose of ESA implementation
could still remain as parts of a larger property rights movement
against ESA.
has not been a single case filed in that [Federal Claims] court alleging a taking under the
ESA.”).
270. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
271. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2005).
272. Id. at 2078.
273. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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The second component requires that the property owner not be
deprived of the economically viable use of his or her property.274
While not possessing the same constitutional certainty as the public
use requirement, the creation by the Supreme Court of the per se
taking in Lucas has created a judicial commitment to the principle
that total economic wipeouts caused by regulation of the property be
compensated “no matter how minute the intrusion, no matter how
weighty the public purpose behind it.”275 In light of ESA precedence
and practice, implementation of the statute should be fairly well
insulated from the Agins test.
One thing that the ongoing Commerce Clause challenges to ESA
may have accomplished is the establishment of a strong precedence
defending ESA as substantially advancing a public purpose.
Regardless of the type of regulatory takings challenge brought before
a court, past rulings on ESA have strongly supported the idea that the
protection of endangered species serves a public purpose. The
findings in NAHB, Gibbs, Rancho Viejo, and GDF Realty that ESA is
consistent with the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution
strongly support the argument that the Act serves a public purpose.
This is significant because public purpose scrutiny is less stringent
than Commerce Clause scrutiny, which additionally requires meeting
276
the substantial effects test. Furthermore, in Tulare Lake, which
required compensation for the implementation of ESA, the Claims
Court held the public purpose of ESA as a given, choosing not to
question “whether the federal government has the authority to
protect . . . [the species], but whether it may impose the costs of their
protection solely on plaintiffs.”277
Despite strong judicial precedence for the public purpose behind
ESA, particular regulations are still subject to the question of
whether they substantially advance that purpose, which is a
determination that can only be made on a case by case basis. The
facts in the GDF Realty case are consistent with the Agins
requirement that regulations substantially advance a legitimate state
interest. The Fifth Circuit found a strong public and state interest
when it heard the case, arguing that a taking of the species could
278
impact biodiversity and research interests, and there should be no
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-567 (1995).
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 316 (2001).
GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cir. 2003).
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doubt that the proposed restrictions would substantially advance that
interest.
To fully pass the Agins test, a regulation must also not deny the
owner economically viable use of his or her property. While
conditions are imaginable whereby the only available options that
could protect an endangered species involve ceasing all economic
activity on an individual’s property, such situations are actually less
likely to occur, given Congress’ addition of Section 10 provisions for
incidental takes. Section 10 allows FWS to issue permits to property
owners that allow for economic activity and incidental takes of
endangered species, provided that a Habitat Conservation Plan
(“HCP”) limits both such takes and economic activity to sustainable
levels.279 Such provisions, which are designed to accommodate both
economic and biological interests, serve as a statutory directive to
avoid situations where economic viability is completely eradicated.
These provisions were also in place in the GDF Realty conflict.
The facts of the case indicate that implementation of an HCP was a
possibility, because the plaintiffs were notified by the agency that the
property “could be developed without causing a take if development,
among other things, [was] scaled back from the canyons, and surface
280
and subsurface drainage and nutrient exchange [was] provided for.”
This would indicate that the ESA regulations put in place to protect
the cave species would still allow for some construction and,
therefore, not deny the owner of some economically viable use.
One issue that could greatly impact this component of the Agins
test as it is applied to ESA is the question of the baseline discussed
above. In the GDF Realty case, the property involved consisted of 216
acres, six of which were deeded for conservation purposes.281 When
the plaintiffs’ incidental take permits were denied by FWS, it was on
the grounds that “FWS decided that the deeded preserves were
inadequate to protect the Cave Species.”282 Combined with the
potential HCP provisions described above, these statements draw a
picture of a conflict wherein the participants are going back and forth,
trying to determine how big of a chunk they can secure for their
interests.

279.
280.
281.
282.

16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2000).
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 626.
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When that determination would be made, the court would have
to decide where to draw the baseline: How much of the original 216
acres should be counted as plaintiff’s property? If the Claims Court
declares the original 216 acres as the property baseline, and the
plaintiffs are allowed economic use of more than just a token amount
of that property, then the Agins test will be passed. If, however, the
Claims Court only considers the property that plaintiffs were not
allowed to develop, then the ESA regulations will likely fail Agins. If
the Claims Court follows Palazzolo, the developable property should
not be ignored in determining “the proper denominator in the takings
fraction.”283
B. Penn Central Criteria
The three-pronged Penn Central test has been more commonly
used by the courts in regulatory takings cases, as most cases deal with
“a regulation [that] places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, [in which] a taking
nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of
284
factors.” The first prong of the Penn Central test looks to the
economic impact that a regulation imposes upon individual property
285
owners. Generally speaking, the higher the economic impact, the
more likely a court will rule that the particular regulation comes with
a cost that, out of a sense of fairness, should be carried by the tax
paying public.286
Combined with this focus on the economic nature of property
controlling regulations, any interference with investment-backed
expectations also increases the likelihood of a finding of a regulatory
287
taking. These expectations, however, must meet a standard of
reasonableness, shaped in part, albeit not determined, by the common
288
law and existing regulations.

283. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
284. Id. at 617.
285. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“The economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations.”) (citations omitted).
286. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (holding that the total
destruction by the government of all value of privately held property has every possible element
of a Fifth Amendment taking).
287. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
288. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the
regulatory regime in place shapes the reasonableness of the owner’s expectations.).
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Lastly, a court using a Penn Central analysis must also consider
the nature of the government’s action, which distinguishes between
legitimate government actions taken with the aim of serving the
public good, and “a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the
289
neighboring ones.” Of course, each of these prongs still carries with
it a degree of ambiguity, and the courts have not been particularly
clear in stating what is meant by each factor, how they are weighted,
and how they relate to one another.290 Due to this ambiguity, as
opposed to in spite of it, a regulatory takings challenge to ESA
analyzed under Penn Central certainly has a chance of success that
should not be ignored.
Without a doubt, implementation of ESA can be costly. Costs
associated with HCP’s, which must be imposed upon either private
individuals or the public as a whole, can potentially cost hundreds of
291
millions of dollars. When those impacts intersect with the economic
investment-backed expectations of the property owner, the likelihood
increases that the Penn Central criteria for a regulatory taking will be
met. Much of this strongly hinges on the case by case variance in facts.
In the upcoming GDF Realty case, these factors will likely have a
strong influence on the outcome. The property in question in GDF
Realty was purchased in 1983 while the listing of five of the six cave
species did not occur until 1988, and the sixth was listed in 1993.292 The
Claims Court, in this particular situation, may be sympathetic to the
plaintiffs’ argument, interpreting the situation as a case of investment
with reasonable expectations thwarted by subsequent regulations.
The Claims Court’s reading of Palazzolo could prove influential on
this point. Although the chronological relationship between the
moments of property acquisition and regulation creation is not at
issue in GDF Realty, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
investment-backed expectations in Palazzolo is related. The majority
decision in Palazzolo, authored by Justice Kennedy, posits property
rights as so fundamental that a simple “post-enactment transfer of
title” should not deprive the latter owner of his or her “right to
challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”293
289. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132.
290. Peterson, supra note 135, at 1317 (1989).
291. See, e.g., Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on
Private Lands, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 35, 35-36 (1998).
292. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2003).
293. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
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Even under such absolutist terms, however, property rights still
remain “subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority,
including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use
restrictions.”294
Concerned that the judicial scales might be tipped too far in the
direction of either of these values, Justice O’Connor issued a
concurring opinion in Palazzolo emphasizing that the timing of
regulations were neither “dispositive” nor “talismanic” of economic
295
expectations. O’Connor ultimately concluded that the Palazzolo
decision “does not remove the regulatory backdrop against which an
owner takes title to property from the purview of the Penn Central
inquiry. It simply restores balance to that inquiry.”296 The fact that the
plaintiffs in GDF Realty purchased the property in a regulatory
regime absent any regulations on species on that property certainly
lends credence to the claim that their reasonable investment-backed
expectations were thwarted. However, the fact that the property was
purchased in a regulatory regime containing background principles
limiting property rights to protect endangered species, in general,
certainly contextualizes those expectations.
The final component of the Penn Central test—an assessment of
the nature of the government’s action—is intended to protect owners
of private property from their property unjustly “being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.”297 Like the two previous economic factors, this third
factor is contingent upon the facts of each particular case. However,
the nature of government actions factor may present a more daunting
hurdle than the two previous factors, especially for ESA regulations
facing regulatory takings challenges.
ESA sparks much heated debate from those on both sides of the
issue. In addition, property conflicts spark equally charged public
responses, as evidence by the recent public and media outcry over the
298
Supreme Court’s Kelo v. New London decision, which has been

294. Id.
295. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
297. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). See also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting that the character of the governmental
action is one of the factors relevant in considering whether public action taken by the
government must compensate economic injuries); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 350 (2002) (quoting Lucas).
298. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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excessively, and in a manner devoid of nuance, referred to as
“disturbing,”299 “a decision that makes it too easy for the government
300
to seize your bedroom,” and “another giant step toward classical
corporatism or fascism in America.”301 Together, these policy issues,
both of which are already susceptible to being interpreted as
fundamentally connected to government intrusion by public opinion,
easily raise calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of government
actions.
The facts presented in GDF Realty before the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals provide not only a good example of the category of
behavior on which the third prong of the Penn Central test focuses,
but also grounds on which the Claims Court could base a finding for a
regulatory taking. The facts in this case revealed FWS acting in a
highly suspicious manner. After the plaintiffs filed for incidental take
permits, and after FWS had determined that the areas reserved to
protect the species were insufficient, the plaintiffs were notified by
FWS that their permits would not be approved. The final denials,
however, were never issued, leaving the issue unripe for challenge.302
The denials were only declared issued de facto in the District Court,
which “admonished FWS for delaying the denials when it had never
intended to grant the permits.”303 While the facts still may be
presented differently in the upcoming trial before the Claims Court,
the presence of a judicial record portraying FWS as an agency using
stall and delay tactics to avoid having their decisions challenged
increases the likelihood that the Claims Court will find the
government’s actions of a nature sufficient to fail Penn Central. These
events also affect a potential ripeness ruling, which must be met
before Agins or Penn Central become relevant.
C. Ripeness
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a
ripeness doctrine for cases dealing with regulatory takings, requiring
299. Robert Trigaux, Your Home Could Be up for Grabs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24,
2005, at D1.
300. Debra J. Saunders, Your Home Could Be Pfizer’s Castle, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,
June 30, 2005, at B9.
301. Edward Hudgins, Your Castle No More, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A20.
302. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-351 (1986)
(requiring a final administrative decision before a challenge can be considered ripe); GDF
Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the lack of a final
denial from FWS prevented plaintiffs from challenging FWS’s action).
303. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
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that a case is not ripe for review unless it deals with a concrete
controversy304 and the particular agency has administered its final
305
decision. While such criteria may seem straight forward, there is still
a great deal of ambiguity in those terms. Much of that ambiguity has
been demonstrated in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
In Palazzolo, the Court found the case to be ripe, although the
state agency had not issued a final decision regarding the amount of
allowable construction. The agency had made it clear that no wetland
construction would be allowed and “federal ripeness rules do not
require the submission of further and futile applications with other
agencies.”306 This rule is called the “futility exception,” and it removes
the necessity of seeking subsequent decisions when an initial decision
“makes it clear that no project will be approved.”307
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court ruled that the case was not ripe,
despite the length in time needed by the regional planning committee,
during which no construction could occur. The Court ruled that to
simultaneously require the fundamental rules of ripeness, including
awaiting the final decision, with a requirement to compensate
property owners for the time, “would create a perverse system of
incentives.”308 The ripeness doctrine does allow for delays in the
agency decisionmaking process, requiring compensation only for
309
While this rule helps to clarify the
“extraordinary delays.”
relationship between time and ripeness, it is still open to
interpretation, demonstrated by the dissent in Tahoe-Sierra that
argued that “a ban on all development lasting almost six years does
not resemble any traditional land-use planning device.”310
The ripeness doctrine also plays a significant role in regulatory
takings cases involving ESA. In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the

304. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981). See also
Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (clarifying that premature claims may not be
considered on the merits, while the relevant regulations or statutes themselves may be
challenged as facially unconstitutional).
305. See Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)
(overturning jury decision in favor of respondent because the taking claim lacked ripeness in the
absence of a final administrative decision); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 351.
306. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
307. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990); Heck v.
United States, 134 F.3d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
308. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 340 (2002).
309. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
310. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Federal Circuit heard Morris v. U.S.311 on appeal from the Court of
Federal Claims. In this case, the plaintiffs had purchased a half-acre
lot in Northern California, adjacent to a river, with the plans of
harvesting six old-growth redwood trees. The plaintiffs asserted “that
this is the property’s only economically viable use.”312 After being told
by the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) that they should
obtain incidental take permits in the event that the harvesting of the
trees impacted endangered fish species, the plaintiffs determined that
the application cost exceeded the value of the property and filed suit,
arguing that the required permit process effectively took their
property.313 The court found the taking claim unripe; not only had the
agency not issued a final decision about the costs involved, but the
plaintiffs also had not availed themselves to remaining administrative
remedies.314 In particular, NMFS has the discretion to provide
technical assistance in the incidental take permitting process and the
HCP process, leaving the final application cost “unknowable until the
agency has had some meaningful opportunity to exercise its discretion
315
to assist in the process.”
In the GDF Realty case, the ripeness doctrine has already played
a role. Prior to the cases involving the endangered cave species, the
same plaintiffs, on the same piece of property, challenged FWS
regulations on their property, this time concerning two species of
316
birds: the black-capped vireo and the golden-cheeked warbler. The
plaintiffs argued that they did not need to apply for an incidental take
permit to develop their property, because the development of their
property would not result in a taking of the species.317 Relying on the
Williamson County requirement of a final administrative decision, the
District Court determined that FWS had not been able to issue its
final decision as to whether a take would occur, and the court was not
prepared to do that job for FWS.318 Furthermore, the court stated
that, if the plaintiffs were right, and their actions were not a danger to
the endangered species, “then no ‘case or controversy’ is before this
311. 392 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
312. Id. at 1374.
313. Id. at 1374-75.
314. Id. at 1376-77.
315. Id. at 1377.
316. Four Points Utility Joint Venture v. United States, 40 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1509,
1510 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
317. See id. at 1511 (noting that it is not the role of a United States District Court to make
final administrative decisions).
318. Id.
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Court, as is required by Article III of the Constitution.”319 This also
would have violated the Hodel requirement for a “concrete
320
controversy.”
Furthermore, in this District Court case, the plaintiffs alleged
that FWS “attempted to prevent the development by coercion and by
321
threatening criminal penalties if a ‘take’ occurs.” As noted above,
this same court criticized FWS for refusing to issue final permit
322
decisions. While such information may construct the nature of the
government’s action in an unfavorable light, this case also
demonstrates that the conflict between the two parties has been
exceptionally confrontational.
As far as the ripeness of GDF Realty is concerned, the result will
hinge on whether the Claims Court determines that FWS has issued
its final decision. FWS has stated that development can occur on the
property, provided that canyon areas and drainage concerns are
323
addressed. The permit application made by plaintiffs, however, was
denied on the basis of inadequate deeded preserves.324 The higher the
level of disparity between these two plans, the less likely the case will
be considered ripe. While FWS has stated what sort of property
development would be permissible, the plaintiffs must approach that
goal meaningfully. The further apart these two proposals are, the less
likely the Claims Court will conclude that sufficient conversation has
occurred between the plaintiffs and the agency administration to
determine “how far the regulation goes.”325
VII. CONCLUSION
326

bases on which
Given the “essentially ad hoc, factual”
regulatory takings jurisprudence rests, it is difficult to determine
exactly how “courts [will] apply the abstract legal rules and principles
currently at play in regulatory takings case” to the “tangible, often

319. Id.
320. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
321. Four Points, 40 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1510.
322. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2003); see also supra note
300 and accompanying text.
323. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
324. Id.
325. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).
326. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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fragile realm”327 of diverse ecosystems, interacting with diverse
property interests. The ways that courts rule on various regulatory
takings challenges to the Endangered Species Act will depend not
only on the specific facts of each case, but also on the divergent ways
in which judges can apply the rules of regulatory takings
jurisprudence to those facts. Ultimately, little advice can be given to
regulatory agencies on how to avoid such takings challenges. Apart
from tempering the nature of the government’s actions to satisfy part
of Penn Central, or delaying just enough to postpone the ripeness of a
case, most of the other factors are economic in nature, and those
components vary from case to case. Judges, in fact, have more control
over the economic impacts of regulatory takings cases, where they
have a degree of flexibility in defining investment-backed
expectations and the property baseline.
Another factor that must be considered here is the set of various
political factors affecting regulatory takings cases and jurisprudence.
Apart from the more obvious factors, such as the political ideologies
of appointed judges and executive branch administrators, the latter of
which partially determines the level of activity pursued by the
agencies in charge of implementing ESA, one should also consider
the role of litigation based interest groups. Groups on both sides of
any issue help to determine the frequency and manner in which such
challenges come to the courts. Since the groups that represent
plaintiffs’ interests, however, are closer to the facts of the conflict and
involved with the parties more directly, their influence is likely to be
greater.
In 1995, when the Supreme Court heard Babbitt v. Sweet
Home,328 several groups filed amicus briefs for both petitioners and
respondents. The case before the Court dealt only with the definition
of “harm,” but property rights challenges were present in plaintiffs’
329
discussion on Section 5 land acquisitions. Of the briefs filed on
behalf of the plaintiffs, all of them addressed regulatory takings
jurisprudence and precedence.330 Of all the groups to file amicus briefs

327. Lise Johnson, After Tahoe-Sierra, One Thing is Clearer: There is Still a Fundamental
Lack of Clarity, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 353, 354 (2004).
328. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Ch. of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
329. Id. at 700-01.
330. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 233, at 30-31 (arguing that
FWS’s regulations violate the Fifth Amendment). Other groups filing briefs supporting
respondents as Amici Curiae include: Institute for Justice, Florida Legal Foundation,
Southeastern Legal Foundation, and Mountain States Legal Foundation.
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on behalf of FWS, only one addressed regulatory takings arguments
in a manner that addressed the legal components of the debate.331
While interest groups seeking judicially imposed limitations on ESA
have historically chosen tactics other than the use of regulatory
takings challenges, that tactic has long been one part of a multifaceted
argument put forward by those groups. Shifts in the political
environment, including, but not limited to, the appointment of
justices with property rights-based interpretations of the takings
jurisprudence, public backlash to perceived threats to private
property, or a salient case with facts favorable to a regulatory takings
interpretation, have the potential to make regulatory takings a far
more commonly used tool against the Endangered Species Act.

331. See Brief for Friends of Animals, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8,
Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859 (Lexis) (addressing the regulatory
takings debate); Brief of Amici Curiae for National Wildlife Federation, Trout Unlimited,
Sierra Club, et. al. Supporting Respondents at 16, Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (No 94-859), 1994 U.S.
Briefs 859 (Lexis) (simply referencing “the dearth of Fifth Amendment takings cases”); Brief
for The Environmental Law Committee of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York
Supporting Petitioners, Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859 (Lexis) (making
no reference to regulatory takings debate).

